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Pseudo-Quintilian’sMajor Declamations:
Beyond School and Literature
Re´sume´: Outre exercice rhe´torique et genre litte´raire en soi, la
de´clamation a une troisie`me fonction, que l’on pourrait intituler
“situational ethics”: le de´clamateur doit se mettre dans la peau
d’un caracte`re et re´pondre aux proble`mes e´thiques qui se posent
pour ce caracte`re.Dans cette contribution il estmontre´, aumoyende
la notion pietas, comment ces trois fonctions se pre´sentent ensemble
dans les Declamationes maiores.
Keywords: Major Declamations, situational ethics, rhetorical exer-
cise, literary composition, pietas
I
n his introduction Antonio Stramaglia points out the dual
nature of the Major Declamations: they can be conceived
as exemplary rhetorical exercises, but also as autonomous
literary compositions. To these two capacities can be added a third,
which is closely connected with both the others and common to
nearly all extant declamations: declamatory themes offer the authors
scope for “situational ethics.” Transcending juridical technicalities
and positing extreme cases, they force prospective speakers to adopt
a particular social role (rich man, poor man, stern father, power-
less son, put-upon mother, etc.) in which to grapple with an ethical
dilemma. To make their plea convincing, the authors—be they stu-
dents or rhetores—must investigate the position of their own persona
and that of their opponent, as well as the conflicting juridical and
ethical norms which have given rise to the dilemma. Family and
sexual conflict, conceptions and problems of private and social be-
haviour, ideas of the self and personal obligations—these are the
main issues addressed in declamations according to Mary Beard.
She states that they “provide a focus for the re-presentation and
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constant re-resolution of central Roman/human conflicts that ev-
eryday social regulations do not (and can not) solve; they offer an
arena for learning, practising and recollecting what it is to be and
think Roman.”1
This process works both ways, as Margaret Imber emphasises:
“Student declaimers actively contributed to the ideological tradition
that was itself shaping their own identities.”2
This facet of declamation manifests itself most clearly when eth-
ical concepts are introduced to furnish moral criteria or a moral
dilemma; but it never occurs in isolation from declamation’s edu-
cational and literary aspects. To illustrate how this works in prac-
tice, I have chosen a concept that figures in fourteen of the nine-
teen Major Declamations3 and is moreover an essential ingredient
of Roman thought and society: pietas. After a brief introduction to
pietas as a general notion, I will discuss its significance in Roman
rhetoric before demonstrating its principal applications in the Major
Declamations.
PIETAS
Pietasderives from pius, thought to be cognatewith purus, “pure”
or “clean”; it denotes the state of having conscientiously fulfilled
one’s duties. Its oldest use, predating the Roman state, is religious,
initially referring to one’s duties towards the family gods and later
including all religious obligations. However, when by Cicero’s time
the word religio (“conscientiousness”; “religious awe”) began to be
used as a synonym, pietas came to include other areas in which a
sense of duty and responsibility was paramount: the family and the
state. In his early work De Inventione Cicero classifies both concepts
under fundamental, self-evident ius naturae before he defines them:
1MaryBeard, “Looking (Harder) for RomanMyth:Dume´zil, Declamation and the
Problems ofDefinition,” in F. Graf, ed.,Mythos inmythenloser Gesellschaft: das Paradigma
Roms (Stuttgart: Teubner, 1993), 44–64 (p. 56).
2Margaret Imber, “Practised Speech: Oral and Written Conventions in Roman
Declamation,” in J. Watson, ed., Speaking Volumes: Orality and Literacy in the Greek
and Roman World (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 199–216 (pp. 209; 212). See further W. Martin
Bloomer, “Schooling in persona: Imagination and Subordination in RomanAntiquity,”
Classical Antiquity 16 (1997): 57–78 and “A Preface to the History of Declamation:
Whose Speech? Whose History?” in Thomas Habinek and Alessandro Schiesaro,
eds., The Roman Cultural Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997),
199–216.
3Namely in Major Declamations 1; 2; 4; 5; 6; 7; 8; 9; 10; 11; 16; 17; 18; 19.
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. . . naturae quidem ius esse, quod nobis non opinio, sed quaedam
innata vis adferat, ut religionem, pietatem, gratiam, vindicationem,
observantiam, veritatem. Religionem eam quae in metu et caerimonia
deorum sit appellant; pietatem, quae erga patriam aut parentes aut alios
sanguine coniunctos officium conservare moneat.4
This does not mean that pietas was stripped of its religious conno-
tations, nor that its essence changed with its applications; rather, the
specific sense of pietas depended on the context in which the word
was used. Thus in De Republica (a political-philosophical work writ-
ten 54–51 bce) 6.16 we find iustitiam cole et pietatem, quae cum magna
in parentibus et propinquis, tum in patria maxima est: ea vita via est in
caelum,5 while in De Natura Deorum (a religious-philosophical work
from 45/44 bce) the religious application of pietas explicitly returns:
est enim pietas iustitia adversus deos.6
Touching upon all major areas of their lives, pietaswas an essen-
tial value for the Romans. The first temple dedicated to the goddess
Pietaswas built as early as 181 bce; soon she also appeared on numer-
ous coins. From the second century bce pietas was used consistently
to account for Rome’s expansionist politics.7 But its embodiment
was found in the Emperor Augustus, who avenged themurder of his
adoptive father Julius Caesar and put an end to civil strife, andwhose
reign was celebrated in Vergil’s epic about the feats of his legendary
forebear pius Aeneas. Subsequent emperors often chose pius among
their titles.8
4Cicero, De Inventione 2.66: “And the law of nature is something which is
implanted in us not by opinion, but by a kind of innate instinct; it includes religion,
duty, gratitude, revenge, reverence, and truth. Religion is the term applied to the fear
and worship of the gods. Duty warns us to keep our obligations to our country or
parents or other kin.” (tr. H.M. Hubbell); see further 2.161; also the contemporary and
quite similar Rhetorica ad Herennium 2.19; but compare Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria
5.10.12 Pro certis habemus . . . ea in quae communi opinione consensum est: ‘deos esse’,
‘praestandam pietatem parentibus’ (“Now we regard as certain . . . things about which
common opinion is unanimous: the existence of the gods, the duty of respecting
parents,” tr. D.A. Russell).
5“Revere justice and piety, which are great with respect to parents and other kin,
but paramount with respect to your country: such a life is a way to heaven” (tr. C.
Walker Keyes).
6“Piety is justice towards the gods” (tr. A. S. Pease). H. Wagenvoort, Pietas
(Groningen-Den Haag: Wolters, 1924), 12, notes that this definition is a translation
of Posidonius the Stoic’s στιν  σι	της δικαιοσupsilonacuteνη τις πρς θεοupsilonacuteς.
7Wagenvoort, Pietas, cited in n. 6 above, pp. 18–20.
8J. Rufus Fears, “The Cult of Virtues and Roman Imperial Ideology,” in Aufstieg
und Niedergang der Ro¨mischen Welt II.17.2, pp. 827–948; 889–91.
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Pietas In Roman Rhetoric
It is not a coincidence that definitions of pietas are often found
in textbooks of rhetoric, for pietas plays an important part in rhetoric
in several ways. Being a sacrosanct concept of universal application,
it was an essential part of the philosophical background Cicero tried
to (re-)claim for the orator:
Nec vero a dialecticismodo sit instructus sed habeat omnis philosophiae
notos ac tractatos locos. Nihil enim de religione, nihil de morte, nihil de
pietate, nihil de caritate patriae, nihil de bonis rebus aut malis, nihil de
virtutibus aut vitiis, nihil de officio, nihil de dolore, nihil de voluptate,
nihil deperturbationibus animi et erroribus, quae saepe cadunt in causas
et ieiunius aguntur, nihil, inquam, sine ea scientia quam dixi graviter
ample, copiose dici et explicari potest.9
Quintilian too wanted the orator to be versed in philosophy, but
he focused rather more strongly on the contribution of ethics to the
education of the orator as vir bonus:
An de iustitia fortitudine abstinentia temperantia pietate non plurima
dicet orator? Sed ille vir bonus, qui haec non vocibus tantum sibi nota
atque nominibus aurium tenus in usum linguae perceperit sed qui
virtutes ipsas mente complexus ita sentiet, nec in cogitando laborabit
et quod sciet vere dicet.10
But of course, if you managed to achieve and display a firm grasp
of ethical values—including pietas—it did not only cause you to be
a good man, but also to appear one. That is, it contributed to ethos
(the image a speaker wishes to present of himself or his client), as
Cicero was already well aware:
9Cicero,Orator 118: “He should not confine his study to logic, however, but have
a theoretical acquaintance with all the topics of philosophy and practical training in
debating them. For philosophy is essential to a full, copious and impressive discussion
and exposition of the subjects which so often come up in speeches and are usually
treated meagrely, whether they concern religion, death, piety, patriotism, good and
evil, virtues and vices, duty, pain, pleasure, or mental disturbances and errors” (tr.
H.M. Hubbell). See further De Oratore 1.56; 2.67.
10Institutio 12.2.17: “Will not the orator have a great deal to say about Justice,
Courage, Abstinence, Temperance, and Piety? But the goodman, who does notmerely
know these things by word and name, and has not simply heard themwith his ears in
order to repeat them with his tongue, but has really embraced the virtues themselves
in his mind and come to have virtuous sentiments—hewill not have any problems in
ordering his thoughts, and will speak out frankly what he knows.”
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Valet igitur multum ad vincendum probari mores et instituta et facta et
vitam eorum, qui agent causas, et eorum, pro quibus, et item improbari
adversariorum. . .. Facilitatis, liberalitatis, mansuetudinis, pietatis, grati
animi, non appetentis, non avidi, signa proferri perutile est.11
He gives a splendid illustration of how he uses pietas to furnish both
himself and his client with the right ethos in Pro Plancio 29:
Omitto illa quae, si minus in scaena sunt, at certe, cum sunt prolata,
laudantur, ut vivat cum suis, primum cum parente—nam meo iudicio
pietas fundamentum est omnium virtutum—quem veretur ut deum—
neque enim multo secus est parens liberis—amat vero ut sodalem, ut
fratrem, ut aequalem.12
Not only ethos, but also logos (argument) and pathos (emotion) could
be buttressed by the use of exempla in which pietas figures promi-
nently. For lazy speakers, Valerius Maximus in the early first century
ce put together a collection of anecdotes; its fifth book is almost en-
tirely made up from exempla concerning pietas. Apart from De pietate
erga parentes et fratres et patriam (5.4) we find 5.5 Fraterna benivolentia;
further 5.6 Pietas patriae; 5.7De parentum amore et indulgentia in liberos;
5.9 De parentum adversus suspectos liberos moderatione.
In argument it was expedient if one could prove that one had
acted from pietas. For precisely because it was a virtuewhich resorted
under ius naturae, it was fundamental and unassailable and put
those who could prove that they possessed, or acted from, pietas,
in the right. This meant that it could furnish arguments for juridical
speeches in cases resorting under the constitutio iuridicialis absoluta,
which occurred when there was no doubt about a particular act or
its perpetrator, but, as the Rhetorica ad Herennium defines it, cum
id ipsum, quod factum est, ut aliud nihil foris adsumatur, recte factum
esse dicemus.13 The example given is known from Roman history:
11De Oratore 2.182: “A potent factor in success, then, is for the characters,
principles, conduct and course of life, both of those who are to plead cases and of
their clients, to be approved, and conversely those of their opponents condemned.. . .
It is very helpful to display the tokens of good-nature, kindness, calmness, loyalty
and a disposition that is pleasing and not grasping or covetous” (tr. H. Rackham).
12“I omit those things which are less in the limelight but are certainly praised
when they are publicized, how he lives with his people, first of all with his parent—for
in my judgement pietas is the foundation of all virtues—whom he venerates like a
god—and indeed a parent is not very different from a god to his children—and loves
like a companion, a brother, a contemporary” (tr. N.H. Watts).
13Rhetorica ad Herennium 1.24: “It is an Absolute Issue when we contend that the
act in and of itself, without our drawing on any extraneous considerations, was right”
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Mimus quidam nominatim Accium poetam conpellavit in scaena. Cum eo
Accius iniuriarum agit. Hic nihil aliud defendit nisi licere nominari eum,
cuius nomine scripta dentur agenda.14 Cicero’s example is a little more
exotic, but still based onhistorical facts. It concerns the Thebans being
charged, before the Amphictyons (a religious council), with putting
up a trophy after defeating the Spartans at Leuctra.15
Quintilian is the first to mention pietas explicitly in connection
with his definition of this status, which he denotes as qualitas absoluta
and regards as eminently sustainable:
Est enim de re sola quaestio, iusta sit ea necne. Iustum omne contine-
tur natura vel constitutione. Natura, quod fit secundum cuiusque rei
dignitatem. Hinc sunt pietas fides continentia et alia.16
His examples of the status are striking: Abdicatur aliquis quod invito
patre militarit, honores petierit, uxorem duxerit: tuemur quod fecimus.17
Although these things may have happened in real life, they remind
one at once of course of Sophistopolis.18 And this brings us to pietas in
Roman declamation.
PIETAS IN THE MAJOR DECLAMATIONS
Since the concept of pietas could contribute to logos, ethos, and
pathos, it was an excellent motif to employ in declamation as a
rhetorical exercise. And given that it concerned the fulfilment of
duties to all that was paramount in the lives of the Roman elite—
(tr. H. Caplan). See also Cicero, De Inventione 2.62 (constitutio (generalis) negotialis); cf.
De Partitione Oratoria 42.
14Rhetorica ad Herennium 1.24: “A certain mime abused the poet Accius by name
on the stage. Accius sues him on the ground of injuries. The player makes no defence
except to maintain that it was permissible to name a person under whose name
dramatic works were given to be performed on the stage.” The mime was in fact
condemned.
15The battle of Leuctra took place in 371 bce; see e.g. Cornelius Nepos, Epaminon-
das 7; Xenophon, Hellenica 6.4.15 mentions a trophy.
16Institutio 7.4.5–6: “The only question concerns the act: is it just or not? All
justice rests either (1) on nature or (2) on convention. (1) ‘Nature’ includes whatever
is done because of the intrinsic value of the particular action. Under this head come
piety, good faith, self-control, and the like.”
17Institutio 7.4.4: “A son is disinherited because he has served as a soldier, sought
office, or married, against his father’s wishes. We defend what we did.”
18Abdicatio was the declamatory equivalent of exheredatio (disinheritance); see
Institutio 7.4.11. Abdicatio is prompted by military service in Seneca, Controversia 1.8;
by marriage in Controversiae 1.6 and 5.2; Declamatio Minor 257; Institutio 11.2.82.
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gods, family and state—it stands to reason that it was also useful
for the other two functions of declamation, i.e. for declamation as an
autonomous literary genre and as an exercise in situational ethics. It
will hardly come as a surprise, then, that out of the 291 declamations19
we have left, 78 have a substantial concern with pietas. What is
remarkable, however, is the type of pietas involved: there are only
three controversiae in which pietas towards the gods is at stake,20 and
just another three in which pietas towards the state is a central issue.21
In other words, the remaining 72 controversiae are all concerned with
pietas within the family.
This does not necessarily mean that the concept of pietas was
narrowed down: rather, it was given a substance prompted by the
themes of the controversiae, which more often than not involved fam-
ily conflicts, usually between fathers and sons. This subject matter
suited declamation’s major target group: Rome’s upper class youths,
who attended the rhetorical schools in large numbers. Although they
belonged to the upper strata of society, they occupied awkward po-
sitions in their private lives: they were in every respect subject to
their fathers’ patria potestas. In practice, this meant that they were not
legally entitled to possessions, that their fathers could order them
to marry or divorce at will, and were even allowed to kill them
with impunity (vitae necisque potestas). It is quite natural, then, that
such unequal proportions of power left their mark on declamatory
themes. In fact, the relationship between father and son is of ma-
jor importance in 125 of the 291 examples we have left, and in no
fewer than 115 of these it is a relationship marred by enmity, mis-
use of power, or downright hatred. The assignment of such themes
afforded put-upon sons the opportunity to take on the role of son
to work off their frustrations, or the role of father to enjoy a taste
of the absolute power in store for them once they themselves were
19I restrict myself to the four extant collections of controversiae (mock-forensic
speeches), leaving aside the seven suasoriae (declamations in the genus deliberativum)
preserved by Seneca the Elder.
20It is made an independent issue in only two. They are Seneca,Controversia 10.5.5
(about the famous fourth-century painter Parrhasius, who has allegedly maimed and
tortured an Olynthian captive to have a convincing model for Prometheus) and
Minor Declamation 323 (an Athenian priest dedicates a temple destroyed and rebuilt
by Alexander the Great). Note that both subjects are set in a distant Greek past. In
addition, Major Declamation 12 contains a brief reference to impietas incurred through
cannibalism.
21They are Minor Declamations 254; 305; 352. In three others (Minor Declamation
315; Seneca, Controversiae 1.7 and 7.7) pietas towards the state is an issue, but one
which is overshadowed by pietas within father-son relationships.
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patresfamilias.22 Their fathers, on the other hand, who liked to de-
claim in competition with each other and with teachers of rhetoric
in theatres and literary salons, could speak to reaffirm their social
status or to probe the limits of what was socially and morally ac-
ceptable. Of course declamatory family dramas often provided roles
for other family members as well—mainly mothers, daughters and
brothers—while power conflicts were also explored in different re-
lationships, such as rich man vs. poor man. However, father-son
relationships predominate in all four collections. And, tellingly, they
occur in 52 of the 72 declamations concerned with pietas in family
relations.
In the Major Declamations these tendencies are exceptionally
strong. In the first place, a relationship between father and son(s)
is an issue in no fewer than thirteen of the nineteen controversiae the
collection comprises. But in only two of these is their relationship
uncomplicated and peaceful; the others abound with fear, hatred,
cruelty and jealousy.23 In two of these, the controversia arises within
the exclusive relationship of father and son (Major Declamations 4
and 17), but in most declamations it occurs in a three-cornered re-
lationship between father, son and a third party. This third party is
either the mother (6, 8, 10, 18, and 19), or a stepmother (1 and 2), or
another son (5) or a friend (9). Secondly, if we add to this number
Major Declamation 16, which involves a triangle of mother, son and
friend, we have at the same time identified all Major Declamations in
which pietas is an important concept.
The significance attributed to pietas and the importance attached
to it in a given controversia depend on its theme. If it centres on a
22For father-son relationships, patria potestas, and vitae necisque potestas in Roman
declamation, see L.A. Sussman, “Sons and Fathers in the Major Declamations As-
cribed to Quintilian,” Rhetorica 13 (1995): 179–92; M. E. Vesley, “Father-Son Relations
in Roman Declamation,” Ancient History Bulletin 17 (2003): 158–80; M. Lentano, “Un
nome piu` grande di qualsiasi legge: Declamazione latina e patria potestas,” Bollettino di
studi latini: periodico quadrimestale d’informazione bibliografica 35 (2005), 558–89; B.M.C.
Breij, “Vitae necisque potestas in Roman Declamation,” Advances in the History of Rhetoric
9 (2006): 55–81, and The Eighteenth and Nineteenth Declamations Ascribed to Quintilian: a
Commentary (Diss. Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen, 2007), 45–62.
23Fathers and sons in Major Declamations 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 17, 18, 19.
Two favourable exceptions: in Major Declamation 7 a poor father offers himself for
torture so as to make his accusation of his son’s rich murderer convincing; in Major
Declamation 11 a father asks to be killed instead of his children. In both cases, a
harmonious relationship is taken for granted; the controversia is between rich and
poor. Major Declamation 4 is a doubtful case, but I feel that the son’s dark impulses
to kill his father are too strong for it to be made an exception.
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harmonious family, their pietas is taken for granted and there is little
need to discuss or expatiate upon it. Of course it can be mentioned to
enhance a speaker’s ethos (and correspondingly detract from that of
his opponent). Thus in the narratio of Major Declamation 7 the poor
father describes how, just before being attacked by his rich enemy,
he and his son were returning home: tuebamur pauperem mutua pietate
comitatum invicem sustinentes, invicem innixi.24 This brief phrase con-
veys a great deal: father and sonwere poor and vulnerable, but found
comfort in their affectionate relationship. The rich man by contrast
appears wanton and callous for attacking the endearing couple. In
the peroratio, pathos is evoked by an apostrophe of pietas personified:
Nunc infelix ad nos, misera pietas, redi, quod fieri in ipsa orbitate non
potuit, et vires, quas inprovisus abstulit dolor, probatio restituet.25
When pietas is bound up with the controversia proper, it figures
more largely. In the remainder of this contribution, I shall concentrate
on its three main occurrences, which are the following. In some con-
troversiae the protagonists explore the limits of pietas: how much of it
may be expected in a given situation? Or, conversely, at what point is
it permissible to refuse others one’s pietas? Further, a protagonist can
be confronted by incompatible claims being laid to his pietas. Thirdly,
involving the status qualitatis, a crime can be defined specifically as
a violation of pietas or, on the contrary, defended as an act of pietas.
I will furnish some examples of each instance; it will turn out that
together they more than cover the three functions of declamation
(educational, literary and ethical) and offer ample opportunity to
apply logos, ethos, and pathos.
The issue of possible limits to pietas is illustrated especially aptly
in Major Declamation 5, the theme of which recalls the biblical story
of the prodigal son: two brothers, one dissolute and one frugal, are
captured by pirates, and the dissolute one falls seriously ill. Their
father scrapes together his modest savings and sets out to redeem
them, but the pirates are not satisfied with the ransom and make
him choose. The father takes his dissolute sick son, who dies on
the way home. His prudent brother manages to escape, but when
back, refuses to provide for his father, thereby contravening the law
247.3: “[W]e used to defend our poor company of two, sharing the responsibili-
ties, while taking turns supporting and relying on one another” (all translations from
the Major Declamations are taken or adapted from Sussman). For the declamation’s
theme, see n. 23 above.
25MajorDeclamation 7.13: “Unhappy, disconsolate fatherly love, return tome now.
This could not occur during the very act of my loss—and yet the process of proof will
restore the strength which my unanticipated grief robbed from me.”
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Liberi parentes in egestate aut alant aut vinciantur (“Childrenmust either
support destitute parents or be imprisoned”).26
The speech is for the father and its central issue is of course:
that this father, who could himself be accused of withholding pietas
because he ransomed only one son and a rogue at that, is nevertheless
entitled to pietas from his virtuous son.
Characteristically, the father’s claim is based on two unequal
assumptions. The first is that he has actually displayed an admirable
amount of pietas throughout; the second, that there is no need for
him to prove his pietas. In accordance with the first, he claims that his
choice betrayed not a lack of pietas, but on the contrary an abundance
of it: after admitting reluctantly but almost casually that he loved his
good son better,27 he presents his partiality as a lack of pietas for his
dissolute son, and the ransoming is made to appear an act to make
amends:
quis nonputet audita condicionevinculame statimdetraxisse languenti?
oderitis licet confessionem meam, deliberavi. tenuit inter illos inexpli-
cabiles doloris aestus, quam longum tenuit pietas misera consilium, et,
quod numquam satis manibus filii, numquam satis excusabo conscien-
tiae meae, non statim mihi ille deficiens unicus fuit.28
Further on a locus communis with a daring twist at the end explains
the essence of a father’s pietas for his children and accounts for this
father’s choice:
par est in omnes liberos eademque pietas, sed habet in aliquo plerumque
proprias indulgentiae causas, et salva caritatis aequalitate est quid-
dam, per quod tacito mentis instinctu singulos rursus tamquam uni-
cos amemus . . . quosdam magis severitas probitasque commendat; in
quibusdamdiliguntur impatientius calamitates, et damna corporumde-
bilitatesquemembrorumnotabiliusmiseratione complectimur. salva est
26For this declamatory law see Breij, Commentary, cited in n. 22 above, p. 74 n.
189 with refs. It had an authentic basis in the Greek γραφ κακσεως τν γονων and
inspired an actual Roman law under Antoninus Pius (emperor 138–61).
27In 5.2.
28Major Declamation 5.4: “Who would not suppose that after I heard the terms I
at once stripped away my ailing son’s chains? Although my admission may displease
you, I had to think it over. Amid these inexpressible surges of grief how long, yes,
how long a debate did my pathetic emotions of love hold? And here’s something
I will never adequately explain away to my son’s ghost, and never to my own
guilty conscience: that son of mine who was sinking fast was not immediately in my
judgment my only son.”
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tamen universitas, cum quicquid in ali<qu>o cessare creditur, in altero
restituit alter affectus.29
But the father also manages to turn the tables on his son with a
tart sententia: eum tantum fratrem putes amari magis, quem non ames,30
and the speech begins with a vitriolic praeteritio, in which he states
that the surviving son has only himself to blame for his father’s
choice:
utcumque igitur, iudices, poteram redemptionis illius reddere de prae-
senti iuvenis impietate rationem, etmihi crudelitas ista praestabat, ut fil-
ium viderer elegissemeliorem, non utor tamen occasionis huius invidia,
nec quicquidmiserae pietatis impatientia feci, querelamalo defendere.31
From these passages it becomes clear at once that this controversia
answers to all three functions of declamation. There is plenty of room
for exercise in logos (the locus communis in 5.12 and the relatio criminis
in 5.1), ethos (the son’s ethos is efficiently damaged in 5.11 and 5.1;
that of the father is bolstered in the locus communis in 5.12 and the
“confession” in 5.4; note how he uses pietas there to refer to himself
metonymically), and pathos (note especially the pathetic style in 5.4).
Its literary character comes to the fore in the pathos of 5.4 and in
the locus communis 5.12—especially in the paradoxical sententia that
concludes it. Finally, all passages have in common that they provide
food for thought about sibling rivalry and relations between fathers
and sons, and invite the audience to explore the values attached
to them.
29Major Declamation 5.12: “There is a similar and identical love towards all one’s
children, but very often it has special reasons for favoritism towards one. Even with
the equality of our love intact, there is something undefinable on account of which
in the silent promptings of the heart we love each individual child in their turn as
though they were an only child: . . . some others a grave and righteous demeanor
[recommends]; in some their misfortunes warm the heart when we can’t bear to
endure them, and through pity we embrace much more obviously their crippled and
deformed bodies. Yet as a whole, a father’s love is secure when what he believes is
lacking in one child is supplied in another.”
30Major Declamation 5.11: “You would only suppose a brother to be loved more,
whom you yourself do not love.”
31Major Declamation 5.1: “In any event, gentlemen of the jury, I was thereby able
to provide a justification for ransoming that son by reason of this youngman’s neglect
of his filial duty. His cruelty furnishes mewith the evidence that I seem to have chosen
the better son. Yet I shall not make use of the ill will engendered by this circumstance,
nor do I choose to defend by means of a formal grievance whatever I did out of
passionate, fatherly love.”
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This last aspect is present even more strongly in the father’s
second line of argument, based on the assumption that he does not
need to prove his pietas:
Parentibus vero liberi non praestatis alimenta, sed redditis. quanto,
dii deaeque, breviora, quanto minora pro tot infantiae, tot pueritiae
sumptibus, tam variis vel abstinentissimae iuventutis impendiis! . . . non
est beneficium quod pascitis, sed est facinus quod negatis. Liberi paren-
tes alant. pudet sacrorum nominum, pudet religionis humanae: hoc
ergo lex erit? quid imprecer homini, quo primus fecit, ut pietate<m>
iuberemus!32
It is argued here that a father has an absolute and unassailable right
to be supported by his children. In fact a father’s absolute rights are
often a subject of discussion in declamation,33 but it should be noted
that the declaimers—sometimes precisely by attacking excesses and
excrescences—usually endorse the established order.34
Because the father in Major Declamation 5 is forced to choose
between his sons, he also has to deal with a second category of pietas
problems: that of being confronted with incompatible claims from
different persons.Althoughhe asserts that hehas a fundamental right
to be supported by his surviving son, more than half of his speech35 is
a justification for letting one claim prevail over the other. Of course
the dilemma gives rise to literary pathos,36 but it also explicitly offers
the audience situational ethics by first positing the hypothesis that
both young men were healthy, then using the figure of communicatio:
Suadete, quid faciam; quid dicitis? ita pietas est abire, discedere, irasci
scilicet, queri et invidiam facere piratis? vos interrogo, liberi, vos, par-
32Major Declamation 5.7: “Indeed, you, as children, do not provide our support,
but, rather, you are paying us back. God knows howmuch briefer and howmuch less
are these expenses compared to so much for their infancy, for their childhood, and to
such numerous and varied outlays for even the most frugal young manhood! . . . it
isn’t a good deed for you to feed me, but it is a crime for you to deny me this. The law
enjoins children to support their parents. It is a disgrace on sacred designations, on
human veneration. So this will be law? What curse shall I call down on the man who
first forced us to command respectful conduct from our children?”
33See e.g. F. Lanfranchi, Il diritto nei retori romani: Contributo alla storia dello sviluppo
del diritto (Milano: Giuffre`, 1938), 246–51; Vesley, “Father-Son Relations,” cited in n. 22
above, p. 173.
34See Breij, Vitae necisque potestas, cited in n. 22 above, esp. p. 71.
355.9–21, i.e. 14 out of 26 Teubner pages.
36The father’s plight is described in emotional terms e.g. in 5.4, cited above with
note 28.
RHETOR ICA366
entes: non ergo facinus est ideo neutrum redimere, quia utrumque non
possis? egregia pietas aequare liberos iustitia desperationis!37
Similar dilemmas are found inMajorDeclamation 2 (as a side issue: the
son had been facedwith the choice whether to rescue his father or his
mother fromaburninghouse) andMajorDeclamation 8,where a father
has vivisection performed on one ailing twin to rescue the other. But
since the author (who also wrote Major Declamations 2 and 5) here
opts for voicing the mother’s accusation of the father, the dilemma
makes way for amplificatio in the form of scathing epiphonemata, true
to declamatory form in their antitheses and paradoxes. Thuswe find,
for example:
novum, iudices, et incognitum rebus humanis audite facinus: iam par-
ricidium pietas, caritas et impatientia orbitatis admittit! malo odium,
querelas, execrationes, quam ut quis liberos affectu, quo servantur,
occidat.
And: non est tanta pietas servare filium quantum facinus occidere.38
Two rivals for pietas can also make different claims.Major Decla-
mation 6 has a father who has been captured by pirates and a mother
who has lost her eyesight weeping for him. Against his mother’s
wishes their son changes placeswith his father; later, when his corpse
has been washed ashore, his mother refuses to have him buried.39
Burial is argued for by his father, who combines arguments in favour
37Major Declamation 5.12: “Advise me what to do—what do you say? Is it in
keeping with a father’s duty just to go away and leave, to be angry, of course,
to complain, and to stir up hatred against the pirates? I ask you, both children
and parents, isn’t it criminal then to ransom neither since you couldn’t ransom
both? Yes, it’s a great display of fatherly devotion to treat your children with even-
handed abandonment of hope.” For the figure of communicatio (making the judges
or even your opponent share your quandary) see e.g. Cicero, De Oratore 3.204; Breij,
Commentary, cited in n. 22 above, p. 350.
388.8: “Gentlemen of the jury, hear of a crime unprecedented and unknown in
human history: now family loyalty, love, and the inability to endure the loss of a
son commits a murder! I prefer hatred, complaints and curses rather than to have
someone kill children with the love by which they are saved”; and 8.15: “It’s no great
display of your devotion to save a son, as much as it is a crime to kill one.”
39In accordance with the declamatory law qui in calamitate parentes deseruerit, in-
sepultus abiciatur (“The man who deserts his parents in distress shall have his corpse
cast out unburied”), for which see Thomas Zinsmaier, Der von Bord geworfene Leich-
nam: die sechste der neuzehn gro¨ßeren Deklamationen, Einleitung, U¨bersetzung, Kommentar
(Frankfurt et al.: Peter Lang, 1993), 14–26. Compare the very similarMajorDeclamation
16, in which an identically afflicted mother tries to stop her son from returning to
the tyrant who had captured him because otherwise his best friend will be punished.
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of his son’s ethoswith a characteristically pithy and antithetical style,
e.g. invenit tamen ingeniosa pietas et utrique subvenit dispendio sui: ipse
venit ad patrem, me remisit ad matrem.40 Also note the paradox in a
prosopopoeia of the son: fas est mihi etiam invitis parentibus pie facere.41 In
fact, the father’s plea rests on two assumptions, which both provide
ample space for ethical disputation: firstly, the son did his duty to
both parents; secondly, the mother lacks proper maternal feeling.
Again, however, the father’s absolute rights over his son loom in the
background:
Poteram quidem fortiter dicere: ‘pater iussi. hoc nomen omni legemaius
est; tribunos deducimus, candidatos ferimus; ius nobis vitae necisque
concessum est. si non fecerit quod iubeo, non deferam illum ad sepul-
turam.’ necesse habuit parere: nondeseruit, sed abductus est . . . sint sane
iura paria, sedeatque medius inter duo filius iudex; non conparabo per-
sonas, quamvis apud omnes gentes plus iuris habeat pater. sit sane
natura communis; non inputabo quod nomen dedi, quod familiam,
quod inpensas, quod, dum illi adquiro, captus sum . . . fuerint quidem
ista facienda, sed ego ius meum reprimo.42
The insistent praeteritiones seem to boost the father’s ethos, because he
appears to waive his rights, but of course what he actually does is
to emphasise them, offering reflection once more on his unassailable
position.
The final use of pietas in the Major Declamations I would like
to discuss is one in which it occurs as an argument for qualitas
absoluta. This is the case inMajor Declamations 18 and 19, the trickiest
accusation and defence in the most outrageous case of the entire
collection. A father suspects his son of conducting an incestuous
affair with his (the son’s) mother. He interrogates the son by means
406.2–3: “Yet his ingeniously clever sense of duty found a solution and assisted
the two of us, but to his own detriment. He came to his father’s aid and sent me back
to his mother.” Note, again, the metonymous use of pietas.
416.6: “I am authorized, even if my parents oppose it, to do my duty as a son.”
426.14–15: “If nothing else I could say with a powerful claim: ‘As your father,
I have given you an order. This title is stronger than any law. We fathers punish sons
who are tribunes and flog candidates for public office. We have the power of life or
death over our children. If he does not do as I order, I will not grant him burial.’ He
was forced to obey me. He didn’t abandon you, he was forced away from you.. . . But
let’s concede that our legal claims are equal, and let our son sit as a judge between
the two of us. I will not compare our separate roles, although all nations give fathers
a higher legal standing. By all means, let his relationship to us be on an equal footing.
I will not claim my credit for giving him his name, a family, money, and for being
captured while adding to my estate for his ultimate benefit. . .. Indeed, those claims
just cited should have been made, but I will suppress my legal right to them.”
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of torture so severe that the young man dies on the rack. Afterwards
the father refuses to divulge whether his son confessed or indeed
said anything at all during the torture. In Major Declamation 19 he
defends the killing of his son43 as resorting under qualitas absoluta,
because it was an act of mercy, inspired by pietas:
et ego amavi filium meum, non osculis, non infirmitate, non lacrimis,
sed viribus, dolore, patientia. unicum, quem, si acie clausisset hostis,
vicaria morte servassem, si subitum cinxisset incendium, extulissem
relicta meorum parte membrorum, eripui malignitati, abstuli famae.
habeo, quod inputem tibi, natura, pietas: rem difficillimam feci, quod
non me potius occidi.44
Pathos abounds and ethos too—or so it appears. But if the killing was
an act of pietas, it was righteous; but if it was righteous, the son must
have been guilty of incest. In other words, the passage is in fact a
highly figured piece of innuendo.
In Major Declamation 18, the accusation, the father’s ruses are
exposed and defused. The killing is condemned as a crime against
pietas: the reverse side of qualitas absoluta. As a result of the murder,
the advocate states, consumpta est paterni nominis religio, omnis pietatis
sublata reverentia.45 A passionate—and surprisinglymodern—plea for
spontaneous, guileless love makes for ethos:
prope est ab incesto timere, ne fiat. malo simplicitatem, quae non verea-
tur infamiam, malo nudos adfectus inconsultamque pietatem; nihil de
se fingi, nihil credant posse narrari.46
43The actual charge against him is not murder, but mala tractatio (maltreatment
of a wife)—for his silence. This makes for a so-called controversia figurata, in which the
official accusation (or defence) serves as a vehicle for other accusations and defences:
in Major Declamations 18 and 19, both murder and incest. See B.M.C. Breij, “Pseudo-
Quintilian’s Major Declamations 18 and 19: two controversiae figuratae,” Rhetorica
24 (2006): 79–105.
4419.4: “I for my part also loved my son, not with kisses, with a woman’s
weakness, or with tears, but with manly strength, my anguish, and my endurance. I
rescued from malice and withdrew from infamy an only son whom I would have
saved by my own death in his place had the enemy surrounded him in battle, whom
I would have rescued at the cost of losing part of my own body had a sudden fire
engulfed him. I also have what I might ascribe to you—natural ties of blood and
parental love: I did a most difficult thing since I didn’t kill myself instead.”
4518.14: “Regard for fatherhood is destroyed and all respect for family ties
annihilated.”
4618.10: “The closest thing to incest is to fear it will happen. I prefer the natural-
ness which doesn’t dread disgrace, I prefer bared affections and family love that need
no circumspection. Let people believe nothing can be badly construed and nothing be
made the subject of gossip about themselves.”
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But at the same time the author defies the limits of what could be
considered morally acceptable, continuing: teneat insatiabiliter, avide;
tanti fama non est, ut amet filium mater sollicitudine pudicae.47
Motherly love is described in disturbingly erotic terms:
Me quidem, marite, si quis interroget, omnes matres liberos suos,
tamquam adamaverint, amant. videbis oculos numquam a facie vul-
tuque deflectere, comere caput habitumque componere; suspirare cum
recesserint, exultare, cum venerit, conserere manus, pendere cervicibus,
non o<s>culis, non conloquiis, non praesentiae voluptate satiar.48
Here we see how in declamation, transgression and inculcation of
moral values can go hand in hand. This is only fitting for a genre
so endlessly versatile that it can serve as an exercise in logos, ethos,
and pathos, as literary entertainment, and as a way to explore ethical
concepts.
4718.10: “Let her hold him insatiably and eagerly; rumour is not so important
that a mother should love her son, yet be anxious about her modesty.”
4818.10: “Indeed, husband, if anybody were to ask me, all mothers love their
children as though they have fallen in love with them. You will never see their eyes
turn away from their appearance and their face, they comb their hair and adjust their
clothing; she sighs when he leaves, rejoices when he returns, she clasps his hands
in hers, she hangs from his neck, she is sated neither with his kisses, his conversation,
or the pleasure of his company.”
